Again. Who's got the nuclear codes? [View all]

The Atlantic: DOGE Could Compromise America’s Nuclear Weapons
by Ross Anderson

https://archive.ph/OViLI

... The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was created by Congress in 1999 in order to consolidate several Department of Energy functions under one bureaucratic roof: acquiring fissile material, manufacturing nuclear weapons, and preventing America’s nuclear technology from leaking. It has all manner of sensitive information on hand, including nuclear-weapon designs and the blueprints for reactors that power Navy ships and submarines. Even the Australian Navy, which has purchased some of these submarines, is not privy to their precise inner workings, James Acton, a co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me.

So far, the people who work for DOGE have not wished to be slowed down by cumbersome information-security protocols. Late last week, they reportedly demanded access to a sensitive Treasury Department system that controls government payments. When the most senior civil servant at the Treasury raised security concerns, DOGE engineers were undeterred, according to The New York Times. They were happy to blast ahead while he resigned in protest.

The employees at DOGE are reportedly working seven days a week, on very little sleep. This slumber-party atmosphere isn’t a great fit for the sober and secretive world of nuclear weapons, where security lapses are hugely consequential. I spoke with three former officials and nuclear experts about what might happen if DOGE were to take a too-cavalier approach to the NNSA. None believed that Musk’s auditors would try to steal important information—although it is notable that not everyone at DOGE is a federal employee, many lack the security clearance to access the information they are seeking, and Musk had to be stopped from hiring a noncitizen. Nuclear-security lapses don’t need to be intentional to cause lasting damage. “When access to the NNSA’s sensitive systems is not granted through proper channels, they can be compromised by accident,” the former senior official at the Department of Energy, who requested anonymity to discuss internal matters, told me. “You could stumble across some incredibly sensitive things if you are coming at it sideways.”

DOGE employees might try to avoid file systems that are known to contain nuclear-weapons designs. But they could still create some risk simply by inquiring into the ways that the NNSA spends money abroad, Acton said. (Overseas expenditures have been a focus for DOGE.) The NNSA helps other governments keep highly enriched uranium secure within their own borders, and also arranges for them to ship it to the United States for safekeeping. The details of these agreements may include information about the degree to which a country’s uranium is enriched, its precise whereabouts, and the nature of the security systems that protect it—all of which are very sensitive. If one of Musk’s recruits were to access this information on their personal laptop, they could expose those secrets to hackers or spies...

None of this is to say that the NNSA should be exempted from questions about its budget. The agency likely overspends on some things, as any bureaucracy will. But nonexperts will struggle to determine what is essential and what is excessive in its highly specialized and technical realm. Building nuclear weapons is not like making widgets. DOGE can try to root out waste, but it should take its time, and avoid the break-it-to-rebuild-it approach that Musk tends to prefer. A tech-start-up mindset might be dangerous, the former official told me. “That doesn’t work with nuclear weapons.”