Stop The Insanity! Russia Recruits Teens to Save the War! - RFU News

Today, the biggest news comes from the Russian Federation.

Here, the Russian war effort has reached a breaking point, forcing the state to adopt measures once thought unthinkable to keep its military machine running. With millions of casualties mounting and the labor force collapsing, Russian teenagers are now rapidly being pulled into the war economy to fill the gaps.

In recent weeks, reports have begun to emerge about significant shifts within Russia’s defense sector. What makes the reports especially alarming is that one of the first confirmed cases of underage labor has emerged at the Alabuga complex, where teenagers are now being used to assemble drones. Some are recruited from technical schools, while others are brought in with minimal training. Most live in guarded dormitories and work under surveillance, with punishments for errors and accounts of forced overtime. The danger is not only the working conditions themselves, but also the fact that Alabuga has always been a high-priority target for Ukraine. Since the Shahed production line supports Russia’s long-range strikes, the entire complex is now a legitimate military target, and the students inside are, in effect, being placed on the frontline.

The situation reflects the broader collapse of Russia’s manpower base, and after more than 1 million wartime losses, including dead, wounded, captured, and discharged, there is no longer enough adult labor to sustain both the military and the economy. Key industries, such as construction, transportation, and manufacturing, are now overstretched, particularly in military zones. The conditions at Alabuga are likely not unique, as similar facilities across the country face pressure to maintain output with a shrinking workforce and rising demand. The same pattern is likely repeating elsewhere: quiet expansions, untrained labor, and no safety net.

Before resorting to underage labor, Moscow attempted to compensate through foreign recruitment, launching large-scale efforts to bring in workers from Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa; however, the results fell short. Most recruits were poorly integrated, lacked relevant training, and faced growing hostility from Russian society. That pressure has also opened doors for Ukrainian intelligence, as some of Russia’s most destructive drone and airfield losses, including the strike that destroyed a third of its long-range bombers in one day, were made possible by operatives exploiting these weak points from inside the labor system. Several were even redirected to combat support roles. These scandals, combined with public resentment, undermined the entire approach. Today, foreign recruitment still exists but is no longer seen as a sustainable solution.

Russia’s reliance on teenagers is not just a labor problem; it is structural, as Russia’s war machine is burning through manpower faster than it can replace it, but instead of scaling back, it just widens the net: first migrants, then prisoners, now pupils. The goal is always the same: sustain the output, whatever the cost. That is why classrooms are turning into dormitories, teachers are being sidelined for production quotas, and students are being taught to wire warheads instead of learning math. However, these adaptations come with a price, as civilian infrastructure is repurposed for military use, the dividing line between civilian and combatant becomes blurred. By militarizing industrial sites and filling them with untrained minors, Russia is exposing them to direct retaliation. If a drone factory becomes a military hub, then civilian workers, including students, are placed in the line of fire. The shift toward mass militarization of society is not strengthening Russia; it is exposing its core, and with every adaptation, that vulnerability grows.

Overall, the use of teenage workers in drone factories is not a temporary fix; it is a warning sign. Russia has run out of spare labor, exhausted its foreign recruitment options, and is now facing a shortage of internal resources. If the war effort now depends on minors to keep production lines moving, it indicates that Russia has exhausted its reserve labor capacity, a sign of accelerating internal depletion. As Russia expands its system to maintain wartime output, the likelihood increases that Ukraine will escalate its deep-strike campaign, targeting not just supply lines, but the very infrastructure and labor model sustaining Russian production.