WASHINGTON DIST #1
SHE VOTED FOR THE AID TO CONTINUE. PATHETIC!

One item that is unclear to me is what the most current bill says about coordination of USA military with the IDF.

https://www.anewpolicy.org/the-legislative-tracker/section-224-ndaa



Summary: Section 219 of the Chairman’s Mark of the House version of the NDAA, and Section 1217 of the Senate version of the NDAA, establish a new U.S. Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative aimed at accelerating joint research, development, and integration of Israeli origin and jointly developed defense technologies into U.S. military systems and programs of record. The bills direct the Secretary of Defense to formalize deeper cooperation and integration across emerging and existing domains, including counter-drone systems, missile and air defense, quantum computing, AI and autonomous systems, cyber and electronic warfare, directed energy, and defense industrial base co-production, while facilitating pathways from R&D into procurement. This section requires regular reporting to Congress on progress and technology transitions, and emphasizes rapid adoption of Israeli defense innovations to strengthen U.S. military capabilities and technological supremacy.

As political pressure builds to reduce U.S. military assistance to Israel, Section 219/1217 provides the framework for continuing - and expanding - U.S.-Israel military ties by entrenching Israeli technology within the U.S. defense supply chain in a way that would shield it from the annual appropriations process. The use of must-pass legislation as the NDAA as a mechanism of integration speaks to the plummeting popularity of continuing unconditional support to Israel.

The original text of this section is derived from were H.R.7540 and S. 3855 (The U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act (Jackson, R-TX/Budd, R-NC) which direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to formalize deeper cooperation and integration.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT—The Secretary of Defense shall designate an executive agent, responsible for synchronizing cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel, to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation.

This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to designate an Executive Agent (EA) to expand and accelerate deeper integration of Israel into U.S. institutions. The EA would be solely focused on implementing Section 219. EA authority takes precedence over the authority of the other DoD Component heads per DOD Instruction 5101.01, meaning that the EA would be able to overrule determinations by other DOD agencies such as the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) on Israeli access to U.S. technology.

The appointment of an EA would replace direct Congressional oversight with supervision by the Secretary of Defense. There would be no Congressional confirmation or ability for removal of an executive agent by Congress.

SENATE: In the Senate version, instead of being directed to designate an executive agent, the Secretary of Defense is directed to consult with the Minister of Defense of Israel to directly establish this initiative, blurring the lines of established conduct and sovereignty by conflating Israeli and American interests. Requiring a foreign defense official to be consulted on which foreign systems are integrated into the US military supply chain gives this state undue influence over American defense decision-making and gives control over aspects of our defense supply chain to a foreign state as potential leverage in future diplomatic disagreements.

(a) (1) Identifying jointly developed or Israeli-origin technologies with operational utility for potential integration into United States systems and programs of record;

Section (a)(1) seeks to integrate American and Israeli research and development programs by encouraging the direct use of Israeli-manufactured technology into the US’ systems, including its military programs. This would render the United States dependent on Israel’s provision of such technologies, thus giving Israel a significant amount of leverage over future American policy and infrastructure. This would go beyond the typical bilateral relationship by significantly enhancing Israeli leverage through control of critical U.S. military supply chains, and may also inherently give preference to Israeli technologies over U.S.-origin competitors..

(a)(2) Ensuring collaborative research initiatives involving government, private sector, and academic institutions in the United States and Israel, is done in a manner that protects sensitive technology and information and the national security interests of the United States and Israel;

This provision would further entangle the defense supply chains of Israel and the United States across government, private and academic sectors, which blurs the lines of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The provision assumes that U.S. and Israeli national security policies and objectives are inseparable, despite very clear current evidence (the Iran conflict, for instance) that they can be divergent.

(a)(3) Facilitating the transition of technologies from research and development into procurement and acquisition pathways;

Subsection (a)(3) directs the accelerated transition of military technologies out of early-stage research, testing, and experimentation and into the formal Department of Defense pathways for funding, buying, and fielding at scale. By targeting procurement and acquisition specifically, the provision is designed to move cooperative efforts beyond research dialogue and toward the actual adoption of technologies into U.S. systems and programs of record. Once such transitions occur, it will be very difficult for future Administrations to uproot such technologies or agreements from major defense procurement programs - and indeed would make DOD Program Executive Offices and Program Managers advocates for the continued inclusion of Israeli-origin technologies in U.S. systems.

(a)(4) Establishing frameworks for joint ventures, licensing agreements, and United States-based co-production or manufacturing partnerships with Israeli industry;

Israeli defense manufactures are often direct competitors to U.S. industry. Establishing licensing and co-production agreements to have Israeli companies manufacture in the United States would enhance Israel’s competitiveness in the U.S. market by sidestepping Buy-America provisions. Furthermore, licensing agreements could give Israeli companies access to intellectual property for weapons systems they are directly competing against.

(a)(5) Coordinating with relevant Department of Defense components, including the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate, capability development and innovation divisions, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Defense Innovation Unit, the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working Group, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, the United States Space Command, the military departments, and other Department of Defense entities, as appropriate, to align efforts and avoid duplication;

Section (a)(5) circumvents the established structures and hierarchy of the Department of Defense by granting the EA the ability to harness the powers and resources of the DoD writ large. It would give that individual the authority to re-allocate the funding and focus of the Department at will, effectively prioritizing the integration of Israel into the US’ national defense structures - and doing so in some of the most sensitive areas of defense technology and operations, giving Israel immense insight into emerging U.S. defense capabilities and operational requirements. This re-allotment of resources could also lead to delays in other fronts, including crucial research and development, given that personnel and funding would be removed from other critical projects in order to focus on this uncalled for integration.

(a)(6) Promoting joint training exercises and information-sharing mechanisms to enhance operational readiness to deploy jointly developed technologies;

Section (a)(6) deepens Israeli integration into the United States’ military infrastructure, as well as intelligence-gathering networks that have directly contributed to civilian deaths in Iran, Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. Incorporating Israel into not just the production of military technology, but also into its usage and implementation, diminishes the American military’s ability to act independently by sharing trade secrets crucial to the US’ defensive and offensive capabilities with a foreign power. Additionally, involving other countries in the development of military tactics decreases the US’ own qualitative military superiority and legitimacy.

Section (b) COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.—The synchronized cooperative efforts under subsection (a) may be carried out through the following domains:

(1) Counter-Unmanned Systems including aerial, maritime, and ground platforms.

(2) Anti-tunneling and subterranean threats.

(3) Missile and air defense technologies.

(4) Artificial intelligence, quantum, machine learning, and autonomous systems.

(5) Directed energy and advanced sensing.

(6) Cyber defense, electronic warfare, and digital resilience.

(7) Biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and medical defense.

(8) Network integration, data fusion, and contested logistics.

(9) Defense industrial base cooperation, manufacturing, and co-production.

(10) Other emerging technologies as jointly agreed by the United States and Israel.

Section (b) extends cooperative efforts with Israel to our most sensitive areas of military research, technology, and production. Among the most concerning of the potential extensions of collaboration is artificial intelligence, quantum and biotechnology.

AI and quantum are/will be tremendously impactful on current and future US military capabilities. Due to the sensitivity of these technologies, US advanced AI, quantum (which has applications beyond computing), and next generation cyber technologies are tightly restricted, even among close allies. Currently, access to U.S. research on such technologies is strictly limited to the UK and Australia under AUKUS Pillar II, a core partnership in countering the People’s Republic of China influence in the Pacific. This legislation would extend access to cutting-edge military AI research to Israel without including counterintelligence or human rights safeguards.

Deepening defense co-operation with Israel, particularly in the field of emerging defense technologies, creates and expands risks to the U.S. military edge. This program would expose future areas of U.S. military advantage to a country that is known to maintain a robust technological espionage program and which has previously exported sensitive U.S. military technologies to adversaries including the People’s Republic of China — the very nation that the only existing US partnerships on AI/quantum military technologies work to counter. Furthermore, Israel is a leading exporter of offensive cyber tools that have been used to target U.S. citizens, including U.S. Government officials.

Additionally, many of Israel’s military technologies have been field-tested in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israeli AI enabled targeting systems, surveillance platforms, and predictive tools have been used in operations that human rights organizations and U.N. experts have linked to war crimes and genocide. Israel uses AI-powered tools to generate lists of buildings to be attacked, assign ratings to residents of Gaza to determine if they are military targets, and determine when a resident is in a particular location. Human Rights Watch has found that these tools rely on systemic surveillance of Palestinians in Gaza that is incompatible with international human rights law. United States integration with AI systems developed and used for these purposes would put us at risk for human rights violations and further erode international trust.

Section (b) also extends collaboration with Israel in the area of biotechnology. The biotechnology field poses both incredible promise and incredible dangers to humanity. The convergence of AI and genomics enables the design of novel or enhanced pathogens that can serve as bioweapons. Because of this, all countries with whom the U.S. has existing Congressionally authorized programs have ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty that prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Israel, however, is one of only 10 countries around the world that has neither signed nor ratified the BWC.

This program, if authorized, would be the U.S.’ first with a country that has refused to foreswear offensive biological weapons, and is widely suspected to have an active offensive biological weapons program. States Parties to the BWC (such as the United States) are required to ensure that any biomedical collaboration with an entity that is not party to the BWC (such as Israel) does not in any way contribute to biological weapons programs, but this program does not include any such safeguards. This gives this legislation the incredibly dangerous potential to implicate the US in the production of bioweapons.

SENATE: The domains specified are largely the same in the Senate version of the NDAA, but the introduction to this section differs: the Senate version states that “the Initiative shall be carried out through cooperative efforts in domains such asthe following.” This language is less specific and limiting than in the House version.

(c) ACTIVITIES IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate activities, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to ensure consistency with existing laws and regulations.

This directs the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with State, Commerce, and other agencies to keep the cooperation consistent with existing law, a routine interagency-alignment clause (notably implicating export-control and trade equities through Commerce).

SENATE: Notably, this section is absent from the Senate version of the NDAA, section 1217. The absence of this routine interagency-alignment clause raises challenges to the Secretary of State’s statutory authority for the continuous supervision of US foreign assistance under section 622 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which mandates that “the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs.”

Sections (d) INTERIM PROGRESS UPDATE and Section (e) REPORT.

The interim briefing (180 days) and the annual report (running through 2030) require DoD to keep the congressional defense committees apprised of who is running the program (the designated executive agent), the state of coordination with Israeli counterparts, which technologies are being prioritized, and what is actually being transitioned into U.S. acquisition programs or fielded systems. The emphasis on "transition, prototyping, or integration" and on "partnerships established with United States and Israeli industry" signals that this is not a study or dialogue but an operational effort to move Israeli technology into U.S. systems and to link the two countries' defense industrial bases.

SENATE: In the Senate text, the reporting requirements are slightly more extensive.

Sections (f) FORM and Section (g) DISCLOSURES:

Reports are unclassified with a classified annex, and DoD must post periodic public updates "to the maximum extent practicable," explicitly framed around how the effort advances "United States technological and military supremacy," while carving out anything that would compromise operational security, export controls, or sensitive technology.

A New Policy’s Recommendation: STRONGLY OPPOSE

A New Policy strongly opposes section 219/1217 because the purpose of this section is to avoid the scrutiny and transparency afforded through the current grant assistance to Israel in favor of a mechanism designed to implant Israel’s defense and intelligence establishments into the most sensitive and basic levels of America’s own defense technology ecosystem. This approach exposes sensitive U.S. capabilities to counterintelligence risk, normalizes technologies developed in contexts of occupation and civilian harm, disadvantages U.S. defense companies ability to compete with Israeli competitors, deepens U.S. legal and reputational exposure without clear strategic necessity, and aims to hide continuing U.S. military support to Israel from Congressional and public transparency.

A New Policy recommends Amendment of the underlying bill to strike this section. Were this section to carry into the version of this bill offered for final passage, A New Policy would recommend voting against the underlying bill.

snip

https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8800

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https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8595

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https://www.congress.gov/votes/house/119-2/247

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So to recap, the cited text is about the wrong Massie amendment to the wrong bill.

Give Democrats a majority, and bills like this will fail in their entirety.

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Fun fact: The most important job of the House Minority leader is to work to elect a majority, not to *inspire* one faction or another as that faction sees fit. This is why Leader Jeffries did not whip the bill on an amendment vote that could have jeopardized the reelection of frontline Democrats, but held his caucus together in voting against the entire bill.


https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL30666

which is what my reply dealt with.

I posted about one thing in my OP, and another in my reply.

in the bill that passed the House on July 15 (with 208 Democrats voting against), but there is coordination of the US military and the IDF in the bill that Senate Democrats successfully blocked on July14?

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5967878-senate-democrats-block-ndaa/

The Senate did not vote on final passage of the NDAA or directly on Section 1217 (the Israel/US military integration part). It instead voted on whether to begin debating the NDAA. The motion failed 50-46 because it needed 60 votes to advance.

That vote breakdown does not reveal which US Senators support Section 1217. For instance, Kirsten Gillibrand co-sponsored standalone legislation in re the US/Israel military integration (see below) but voted against advancing the broader NDAA, an example as to why that procedural vote cannot be treated as a referendum on the integration plan.

Here is more on the standalone bill attempt at integration (both in the House and in the Senate):

Congressman Don Davis Co-Leads Bipartisan Bill to Modernize America’s Defense Technologies and Strengthen U.S.-Israel Alliance

https://dondavis.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressman-don-davis-co-leads-bipartisan-bill-modernize-americas-defense

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Congressmen Don Davis (NC-01) and Ronny Jackson (TX-13) introduced H.R. 7540, the United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act of 2026. This bill would establish a United States–Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative to accelerate the development and deployment of next-generation defense technologies, ensuring that investments in collaborative technologies deliver an operational edge to America's servicemembers. Senators Ted Budd (NC) and Kirsten Gillibrand (NY) introduced companion legislation in the Senate.

“By establishing the United States–Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative, we are fortifying a vital partnership, accelerating joint development, and transforming groundbreaking research into operational capabilities,” said Congressman Don Davis. “As emerging threats like unmanned systems and electronic warfare evolve, technical cooperation stands as a critical pillar in preparing our servicemembers for the challenges of tomorrow.”

“This legislation secures America’s competitive edge in defense technology and reinforces our alliance with Israel, our greatest partner in the Middle East, to deter evolving global threats,” said Congressman Ronny Jackson. “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are ensuring the technological supremacy of our military and delivering the unmatched capabilities our warfighters need to dominate the battlefield and protect the American people.”

“The U.S. has a long history of working with our ally Israel on defense programs to counter unmanned aerial systems from our adversaries, strengthen missile defense, and detect and neutralize underground tunnels threatening the security of our two respective countries,” said Senator Ted Budd. “The U.S.–Israel FUTURES Act offers an opportunity to strengthen existing bilateral programs by advancing joint investments such as emerging technologies, defense industrial base cooperation, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology initiatives. I am proud to be working with Senator Gillibrand to advance regional security in the Middle East and strengthen U.S. and Israeli defense.”

snip

I work hard to elect Democrats who can win general elections in my district.

It’s a very narrow majority that voted to cut aid. Something to build on.

That Cuellar would be a nay. A leopard never changes its spots.

That was one of the arguments that kept popping up against her.

TikToky people who don't blink their eyes, "Jasmine Crockett supports genocide. Talarico doesn't"

Adams voting no is a surprise and Davis not voting at all is a surprise. I am guessing Davis would be a no had he voted. Adams is in a very Democratic district so her vote is surprising.

DeLauro Democratic Connecticut No

Espaillat Democratic New York No (prime example of why he lost his primary)

Lieu Democratic California No (my House member, I already contacted his office via phone and an email and expressed my displeasure)

Many of the Nays were hardly surprising.

Some of the Yeas were pleasantly surprising:

Auchincloss Democratic Massachusetts Aye (very surprised)

Clark (MA) Democratic Massachusetts Aye (Dem leader)

Garcia (CA) Democratic California Aye (Dem leader as a ranking member)

Goodlander Democratic New Hampshire Aye

Houlahan Democratic Pennsylvania Aye

Min Democratic California Aye

Moulton Democratic Massachusetts Aye

Pelosi Democratic California Aye

Scanlon Democratic Pennsylvania Aye

Smith (WA) Democratic Washington Aye

Tran Democratic California Aye

Another reason she is unfit to be MN’s next Senator. Go Peggy Flanagan!

Happily, my NH US Rep voted “yea” (Maggie Goodlander); the only other NH US Rep voted “present” (Chris Pappas). Pappas takes a lot of AIPAC money, which a lot of NH Dems are angry about; to keep this money flowing, he couldn’t bring himself to vote to stop military aid to Israel.

It should not tear the party apart and I will vote in the primaries based on it, but no matter who is our nominee, they're getting my vote in the Fall for sure.

Personally, I believe the only way for Israel to make peace is for the US to completely cut it off from all military aid. Power imbalances like exist with Israel and its enemies make peace impossible when one side can just kill without fear of any proportional impact on their side. When your side is killing 200 people for every 1 person you lose, you might as well just keep killing until there are none left.

Rec

Adding this link

Trump’s Board of Peace drops full Gaza recovery plan in favour of tiny pilot scheme
Revised plan aims to ‘keep something going’ amid fears Netanyahu may gamble on new all-out offensive before Israeli elections

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/16/trumps-board-of-peace-drops-full-gaza-recovery-plan-for-tiny-pilot-scheme

https://tonko.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4617